For cooperative fuzzy games with a non−empty core hypercubes catching the core, the Weber set and the path solution cover are introduced. Using the bounding vectors of these hypercubes, compromise values are defined. Special attention is given to the relations between these values for convex fuzzy games. * This paper was written while the authors were research fellows at the ZiF (Bielefeld) for the project "Procedural Approaches to Conflict Resolution", 2002. We thank our hosts for their hospitality.
Introduction
The theory of cooperative fuzzy games started with work of Aubin (1974 Aubin ( , 1981 , where special attention is paid to the core concept. Other interesting multi−valued solutions for cooperative fuzzy games are the Weber set, the participation monotonic allocation schemes (cf. Brânzei et al., 2002) , the fuzzy population monotonic allocation schemes (cf. Tsurumi et al., 2001 ), the fuzzy version of the Milnor set of reasonable payoffs for crisp games (Milnor, 1952 ) and the path solution cover, which we introduce in this paper.
Much work has been done in developing one−point solution concepts of cooperative fuzzy games. Shapley values as one−point solution concept for this kind of games are studied in Aubin (1974 Aubin ( , 1981 , Butnariu (1978) , Butnariu and Klement (1993), Tsurumi et al. (2001) . In Molina and Tejada (2002) , and Sakawa and Nishizaki (1994) the equalizer and the lexicographical solutions are considered. We enlarge the existing literature concerning one−point solution concepts for cooperative fuzzy games with compromise values.
In the theory of cooperative crisp games these values (cf. Tijs, 1981;  Tijs and Lipperts, 1982; Tijs and Otten, 1993; Bergantiños and Massó, 1996;  van den Brink, 1994 Brink, , 2002 ; van Heumen, 1984) arise as feasible compromises between upper and lower bounds of the core. Inspired by this literature, the objectives of this paper are on one hand to introduce upper and lower bounds for the core, the Weber set and the path solution cover of fuzzy games, and on the other hand to define compromise values based on these bounds. Special attention will be given to relations between these bounds and compromise values for the class of convex fuzzy games, introduced in Brânzei et al. (2002) .
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we recall some notions and facts from the theory of cooperative fuzzy games. Path solutions and their convex hull, the path solution cover, are introduced in Section 3.
For fuzzy games with a non−empty core, hypercubes catching the core, the Weber set and the path solution cover and related compromise values are defined and studied in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
Preliminaries
Given the set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of players, a fuzzy coalition is a vector s ∈ , telling what such a coalition can achieve in cooperation.
The set of fuzzy games with player set N will be denoted by F G N . The core of a fuzzy game v (Aubin, 1974) is defined by
where we use the notation e S for S ⊂ N for the vector with 
For each ordering σ of N the marginal vector m 
3 Path solutions and the path solution cover 
(iii) for each k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , m − 1}, there is one player i ∈ N (the acting player in point p k ) such that
For a path π = hp 0 , p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p m i let us denote by P i (π) the set of points p k , where player i is acting, i.e. where
. Given a game v ∈ F G N and a path π, the payoff vector x π (v) ∈ < N corresponding to v and π has the i−th coordinate
Given such a path hp 0 , p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p m i of length m and v ∈ F G N , one can imagine the situation, where the players in N, starting from non−cooperation
N´i n m steps, where in each step one of the players increases his participation level. If the increase in value in such a step is given to the acting player, the resulting aggregate payoffs lead to the vector
We call x π (v) a path solution.
Let us denote by P (N) the set of paths in [0, 1] N . Then we denote by P (v) the convex hull of the set of path solutions and call it the path solution cover. Hence,
Note that all paths π ∈ P (N) have length at least n. There are n! paths with length exactly n; each of these paths corresponds to a situation where one by one the players − say in the order σ(1), σ (2), . . . , σ(n)− increase their participation from level 0 to level 1. Let us denote such a path along n edges by π σ . Then
Clearly,
In Brânzei et al. (2002) it was proved that the core of a fuzzy game is a subset of the Weber set. Hence
and let π ∈ P (N) be the path of length 3
given by
, 0´,
The two shortest paths of length 2 given by π
Hypercubes as catchers of sets of payoff vectors for fuzzy games
A hypercube in < N is a set of vectors of the form
where a, b ∈ < N , a ≤ b (and the order ≤ is the standard partial order in The objective of this section is to introduce and study catchers of the core, the Weber set and the path solution cover.
Let us first introduce a core catcher
for a game v ∈ F G N * , where for each k ∈ N :
Proposition 2 For each v ∈ F G N * and each k ∈ N :
Proof. Take x ∈ C(v).
(i) For each k ∈ N and ε ∈ (0, 1] we have
(i) and (ii) imply the inequalities in the proposition and the fact that
Now we introduce for each v ∈ F G N * a fuzzy variant HW (v) of the hypercube of reasonable outcomes of Milnor (1952) ,
where for each k ∈ N :
Then we have

Proposition 3 For each v ∈ F G N * the hypercube HW (v) is a tight catcher of W (v).
Proof. Left to the reader.
Theorem 4 Let v ∈ F G
N * be a convex game. Then HC(v) = HW (v) and this hypercube is a tight catcher for
Proof. From (1) it follows that for a convex game v ∈ F G N * it holds that So, we obtain
Similarly, from (1) it follows
This implies that HC(v) = HW (v).
That this hypercube is a tight catcher of C(v) = W (v) (see (2)) follows from the facts that
where σ and τ are orderings of N with σ(1) = k and τ (n) = k, respectively.
For convex fuzzy games this theorem has consequences with respect to the coincidence of some of the compromise values, which will be introduced in the next section (see Theorem 7).
Let us call a set [a, b] with a ≤ b and a ∈ (< ∪ {−∞}) N and b ∈ (< ∪ {∞}) N a generalized hypercube.
Now we introduce for v ∈ F G
N * the generalized hypercube
which catches the path solution cover P (v) as we see in Theorem 5 (i), where for k ∈ N : 
Proof. (i) follows from the fact that for each path π and i
and similarly
(ii) From (1) for a convex game it follows that
Compromise values for fuzzy games
In Tijs (1981) bounds for the core of a crisp game (cf. Tijs and Lipperts, 1982) were used to introduce two compromise values for such games, the σ−value and the τ −value. For a survey on compromise values for crisp games we refer to Tijs and Otten (1993) . To start with the first type, consider a hypercube [a, b] in < N and a v ∈ F G N * such that the hypercube contains at least one efficient vector, i.e.
Then there is a unique point c (a, b) on the line through a and b which is also efficient in the sense that c (a, b) is the convex combination of a and b, which is efficient. We call c(a, b) the feasible compromise between a and b.
Now we introduce the following three σ−like compromises for v ∈ F G N * :
and
if the generalized hypercube HP (v) is a hypercube.
Note that
so all hypercubes contain efficient vectors and the first two compromise value vectors are always well defined. In this paper we will not deal with properties and axiomatic characterizations of the values; for such a task Tijs (1987) can be a useful guide.
For the τ −like compromise values we need to define so−called remainder vectors with the aid of a fuzzy version of the maximal remainder map M v :
The latter was defined in Driessen and Tijs (1985) , inspired by the work of Bennett and Wooders (1979) . The fuzzy
The following proposition shows that m v assigns to each upper bound z of the core (i.e. z ≥ x for each x ∈ C(v)) a lower bound m v (z) of the core, called the remainder vector corresponding to z.
Proposition 6 Let v ∈ F G
N * and let z ∈ < N be an upper bound of C(v).
Then m v (z) is a lower bound of C(v).
Proof. Take i ∈ N and x ∈ C(v). We have to prove that m
where the first inequality follows from x ∈ C(v) and the second inequality from the fact that z is an upper bound for C(v), and then z ≥ x. Hence 
The compromise value val 
Theorem 7 Let v ∈ F G
N be a convex game. Then
Take an ordering σ of N with σ(1) = k. Then
Now, note that for each t ∈ {2, . . . , n}, the increasing average marginal return property (1) implies , 5 6´.
